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Aldrich Ames, the CIA agent who sold secrets to the Soviet Union,
"did not 'beat' the polygraph tests; instead, he simply talked the CIA
out of believing the results, which showed deception every time he
took the test. Since the false positive error rate is approximately 10
percent... Ames could have argued with some force that the positive
results were false."'
Introduction
After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 overruled Frye v. United States,' the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Posado4 stated that "the rationale un-
derlying this circuit's per se rule against admitting polygraph evidence
did not survive Daubert."' The court went on to comment that "[t]here
can be no doubt that tremendous advances have been made in poly-
graph instrumentation and technique in the years since Frye [1923] ....
Current research indicates that, when given under controlled condi-
tions, the polygraph technique accurately predicts truth or deception
between seventy and ninety percent of the time.",6 The court, however.
limited its ruling, commenting that:
[W]e do not now hold that polygraph examinations are scientifi-
cally valid or that they will always assist the trier of fact .... We
merely remove the obstacle of the per se rule against admissibility,
which was based on antiquated concepts about the technical ability
of the polygraph and legal precepts that have been expressly over-
ruled by the Supreme Court.
7
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits adopted the same position.' Two
other circuits had embraced this position prior to Daubert; the Seventh
Circuit had long abandoned the per se rule,9 and in 1989 the Eleventh
1. Daubert May Presage New Role for Polygraphs as Evidence, BNA CRIMINAL
PRACTICE MANUAL 195,201 (1997) (quoting Dr. David Raskin).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See generally I PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 1 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing Daubert and Frye).
3. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
5. Id. at 429.
6. Id. at 434.
7. Id. See also United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1515 (5th Cir. 1996) (trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding polygraph evidence).
8. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that its
former per se rule of exclusion is inconsistent with Daubert); United States v. Call. 129 F.3d
1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997) (same).
9. See United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 205 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Our decisions ac-
knowledge the considerable scientific and legal debate over polygraph testing and recognize
that a trial court deciding whether to admit polygraph evidence 'must engage in a delicate
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Circuit followed suit.'°
Other circuits took a more cautious approach." Indeed, the Sec-
ond Circuit wrote that "the 'legal Pandora's box' which the Fifth Cir-
cuit opened in United States v. Posado... is not yet agape in this Cir-
cuit."'2 In addition, the state cases have not been influenced by this de-
velopment; several have reaffirmed the rule of categorical inadmissi-
bility, 3 even while citing Daubert.4 Other courts have continued to re-
quire stipulations.5 Nevertheless, Daubert has dramatically changed
balancing of many factors including probative value, prejudicial effect, confusion of the is-
sues, misleading the jury, and undue delay.") (quoting United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472,
1480 (7th Cir. 1992)).
10. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989). See also Barker v.
Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 1159, 1161-62 (N.D. 1995) ("Surprisingly, in the six
years since Piccinonna, the Eleventh Circuit appears not to have had opportunity to elabo-
rate on the decision, other than to decide that it was not to be applied retroactively.").
11. See Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that "unilater-
ally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Evidence Rule 403");
United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) ("A privately commissioned
polygraph test, which was unknown to the government until after its completion, is of ex-
tremely dubious probative value."); United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 729 (8th Cir.
1996) (defendant failed to lay a foundation for polygraph admissibility).
12. United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The record before us
simply does not provide the proper opportunity to explore the validity of polygraph evidence
under Rule 702."). See also United States v. Pitner, 969 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wash. 1997);
United States v. Castillo, 1997 WL 83746 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (polygraph evidence not admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 608); Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581, 587 (D. Conn.
1996) ("[W]hile the accuracy of the CQT polygraph exam has been tested, there are serious
flaws which may underestimate the error rates."); Miller v. Heaven, 922 F. Supp. 495, 503
(D. Kan. 1996) (insufficient showing under Daubert and excludable under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403); United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 757, 740 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (ex-
cluding evidence); United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[Tjhe
polygraph results here are properly excluded under Rule 403."); United States v. Black, 831
F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("After evaluating the standard set forth in the Daubert
case, premised on Rule 702..., the Court believes that nothing in Daubert would disturb the
settled precedent that polygraph evidence is neither reliable nor admissible.").
13. See, e.g., People v. Gard, 632 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ill. 1994) ("[The use of polygraph
evidence.., is no less repugnant to and no less an affront to the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess when the examination has been given to a witness... than it is when the examination
has been given to the defendant himself.").
14. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (Conn. 1997) (adopting Daubert and exclud-
ing polygraph results under Rule of Evidence 403); State v. Beard, 461 S.E.2d 486, 493 (W.
Va. 1995),("[W]e remain convinced that the reliability of such examinations is still suspect
and not generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Therefore, any specula-
tion that our position in Frazier regarding polygraph admissibility is in question due to the
Daubert/Wilt rulings is put to rest today.").
15. See, e.g., State v. Webber, 918 P.2d 609, 619-20 (Kan. 1996) (citing "the ironclad
rule that the results of such examinations are inadmissible absent a stipulation between the
parties"); State v. Cosby, 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1996) (reaffirming the need for a stipula-
tion).
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the legal landscape. In this altered climate, some district courts have
admitted polygraph evidence' 6-- for example, United States v. Crumb y'
and United States v. Galbreth.8 In short, the "trend appears to be mov-
ing toward admissibility. 9
Recently, in United States v. Scheffer,20 the United States Supreme
Court held that the per se rule of exclusion is not unconstitutional. The
Court's ruling was not surprising, given the limited nature of the consti-
tutional right at issue.1 What was unexpected was Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion, in which three other justices joined. He wrote that:
I doubt, though, that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, and some
later case might present a more compelling case for introduction of
the testimony than this one does. Though the considerable discretion
given to the trial court in admitting and excluding scientific evidence
is not a constitutional mandate, there is some tension between that
rule and our holding today. And, as Justice Stevens points out [in
dissent], there is much inconsistency between the Government's ex-
tensive use of polygraphs to make vital security determinations and
the argument it makes here, stressing the inaccuracy of these tests.22
In addition to the admissibility and constitutional issues, 3 the
16. See United States v. Padilla, 908 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (admitting polygraph
evidence offered by the defense); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. La.
1995) (admitting polygraph evidence in a civil case).
17. 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995).
18. 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995).
19. Thomas E. Zehnle, Polygraph Admissibility in the Post-Daubert Era, ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11, 13 (Summer 1997).
20. 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces had held
that Military Rule 707, which excludes polygraph evidence, was unconstitutional as applied
in that case. See United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 445 (C.C.A.F. 1996). In that court's
view:
A per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to rebut an attack
on his credibility, without giving him an opportunity to lay a foundation under Mil.
R. Evid. 702 and Daubert, violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.
We limit our holding to exculpatory evidence arising from a polygraph examination
of an accused, offered to rebut an attack on his credibility.
Id.
21. In the Court's view, evidence "rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a
defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the purposes they are de-
signed to serve.' Moreover, we have found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally
arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the ac-
cused." Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1264 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 1269 (citations omitted).
23. Several constitutional arguments have been advanced to support the admissibility of
polygraph evidence. First, defendants have argued, as in Scheffer. that the constitutional
right to present a defense includes the right to introduce favorable polygraph results. Sec-
ond, defendants also have argued for a constitutional right to impeach prosecution witnesses
who have failed government-administered examinations. See 1 GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 8-3(D) (discussing constitutional arguments).
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polygraph technique is worth examining for other reasons. First, the
polygraph cases provide a rich history of how courts have grappled
with scientific evidence. No other scientific technique has been subject
to judicial review for such a long period; it has been 75 years since Frye
was decided. For the most part, other techniques came to the courts
only once: they were accepted or rejected, albeit often over a tortuous
path. In contrast, the polygraph fades into the background and then
erupts back to the forefront as in the 1970's, 1980's, and now the post-
Daubert cases.
Second, in many ways the courts' treatment of polygraph evidence
has differed radically from their approach to other scientific tech-
niques. The paradoxes are striking. For example, many jurisdictions
admit polygraph evidence upon stipulation, even though the stipulation
does nothing to enhance the reliability of the evidence, which is the
principal reason for exclusion.24 Similarly, courts have admitted poly-
graph evidence in suppression hearings, sentencing hearings, motions
for new trial proceedings, and prison disciplinary hearings.' Moreover,
some courts have enforced plea bargains based on polygraph evi-
dence.2
Third, the extensive use of the polygraph by the government raises
another paradox-especially for prosecutors challenging its admissibil-
ity. In 1996, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted 12,548
polygraph examinations. Sixty-three percent (7,945) involved the DoD
Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Program. The other cate-
gories include 21.5% criminal investigations (2,696), 4.6% exculpatory
(579), and 10.6% miscellaneous (1,328). The latter includes security
investigations, counterintelligence and intelligence operations, and as-
sistance to non-DoD federal agencies.27 Further, the Department of
Defense Polygraph Institute (DoDPI) trains 100 federal examiners a
year in a masters level program7 and allocates funds for polygraph re-
search.
24. See id at § 8-3(B) (discussing admissibility by stipulation).
25. See id at § 8-3(E) (discussing admissibility in proceedings other than trials).
26. In some cases prosecutors have gone beyond stipulating to the admissibility of test
results and have agreed to dismiss charges if the defendant passes a polygraph examination.
See id at § 8-4(C) (discussing pretrial agreement cases). See also United States v. Santiago-
Gonzales, 66 F.3d 3, 6 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995) (polygraph used to measure defendant's require-
ment to be truthtul under a plea agreement).
27. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, POLYGRAPH PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1 (1996) [hereinafter DODPI 1996 ANNuAL REPORT].
28. The DoDPI trains all federal polygraph examiners. See also Ronald M. Furgerson,
Perspectives on Polygraphs: A Guide to Survival, 21 POLYGRAPH 164, 164 (1992) (from 1977
to 1992, 115 FBI agents attended the DoD Polygraph Institute (or its predecessor); they
have conducted over 40,000 polygraph exams).
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1. Pre-Daubert Decisions
The admissibility of polygraph evidence was first considered and
rejected in Frye v. United States, 9 the 1923 case in which the D.C. Cir-
cuit established the "general acceptance" test for the admissibility of
scientific evidence. According to the court, a precursor of the modem
polygraph" had not gained general acceptance in the fields of psychol-
ogy and physiology.3' From Frye until the 1970's, the courts over-
whelmingly rejected polygraph evidence.
A. 1970's Cases
In 1972, several trial courts departed from nearly fifty years of
precedent and admitted the results of unstipulated polygraph examina-
tions. In United States v. Ridling,32 a federal district court found that
"the theory of the polygraph is sound" and "directly relevant" to the
issue being litigated (perjury). 3  The court further held that the results
of a polygraph examination conducted by a court-appointed expert
would be admissible under certain conditions. In United States v. Zei-
ger,4 another district court held that the "polygraph has been accepted
by authorities in the field as being capable of producing highly pro-
bative evidence in a court of law when properly used by competent,
experienced examiners."35 In addition, in People v. Cutter,6 a Califor-
nia trial court admitted polygraph evidence during a suppression hear-
ing after finding that the "polygraph now enjoys general acceptance
among authorities, including psychologists and researchers.., as well
as polygraph examiners."37 In the next year, a third district court, in an
extensive opinion, stated that polygraph results would have been ad-
mitted if the court had not been bound by precedent.38 Several other
29. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
30. The instrument used in Frye measured only one physiological response (blood pres-
sure), whereas the modern polygraph measures respiration and galvanic skin resistance in
addition to blood pressure. The machine in Frye also did not record continuously, as does
the modern machine. The technique also has been improved through the development of
control questions, the pretest interview, and stimulation methods.
31. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
32. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
33. Id. at 95.
34. 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 690.
36. 12 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2133 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1972).
37. Id. at 2134.
38. See United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1391 (S.D. Cal.), affd, 470 F.2d
1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973).
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courts also admitted polygraph evidence at this time, in civil cases,39
and, under special circumstances, in criminal litigation.'
In 1974, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts admitted
polygraph evidence without stipulation in Commonwealth v. A Juve-
nile.4' In 1975, the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Dorsey42 held
that polygraph results are admissible if (1) the operator was qualified,
(2) the testing procedures were reliable, and (3) the test of the particu-
lar subject was valid. An Ohio trial court in 197743 and a New York
trial court in 1979" reached similar results.
The trend in favor of admissibility, which these cases seemed to
forecast, never developed. Zeiger was reversed per curiam,45 while
Ridling and Cutter were never appealed, thus precluding appellate ap-
proval. Nevertheless, the judicial approach to polygraph evidence
seems to have been altered by these decisions and the attention that
they received in the legal literature. 6 In particular, after these deci-
sions were rendered a number of courts admitted polygraph results
upon stipulation.47 By the end of the decade the cases could be divided
into three groups. The first consisted of those courts that adhered to
the traditional position, holding polygraph evidence per se inadmissi-
ble.' A second group of courts admitted polygraph evidence upon
stipulation.49 Finally, a few courts entrusted the admissibility of poly-
graph evidence to the discretion of the trial court.50
B. 1980's Cases
Developments in the 1980's were mixed. In 1982, a California ap-
39. See, e.g., Walter v. O'Connell, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388 (Queens Civ. Ct. 1972); In re
Stenzel, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Niagara Cty. Fain. Ct. 1972).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (Brady
issue); State v. Watson, 278 A.2d 543, 546 (Hudson Cty. Ct. 1971) (sentencing).
41. 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
42. 539 P.2d 204,205 (N.M. 1975).
43. See State v. Sims, 369 N.E.2d 24, 32 (Ohio C.P. 1977) (citing constitutional
grounds).
44. See People v. Daniels, 422 N.Y.S. 2d 832,837 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
45. United States v. Zeiger, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
46. See generally Barry Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in
Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L. 917 (1975); Note,
The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 CoLuM. L. REv. 1120 (1973); Note, Pinocchio's
New Nose, 48 N.Y.U. L. RnV. 339 (1973).
47. The leading stipulation case, State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894 (Ariz. 1962), was decided
in 1962 but most of the decisions adopting Valdez were decided in the late 1970's and 1980's.
48. See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 8-3(A).
49. Id at § 8-3(B).
50. Id at § 8-3(C).
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pellate court opened the door to the possible admission of polygraph
evidence." In 1983, New Mexico adopted Evidence Rule 707, which
permits the admission of polygraph evidence. In 1986, the Idaho Su-
preme Court ruled polygraph evidence admissible in proceedings un-
der the Child Protective Act.52 In 1987, the Court of Military Appeals
ruled polygraph evidence admissible," as did the Eleventh Circuit in
1989. 54
There were also major setbacks. The California legislature closed
the door opened by Witherspoon, enacting a statute that allows admis-
sion only of stipulated polygraph results."5 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, which had decided a landmark case admitting poly-
graph evidence without stipulation, 56 abruptly changed direction and
excluded polygraph evidence.' In 1991, Military Rule of Evidence 707
abrogated the Gipson decision, making polygraph results per se inad-
missible. This was the basis of Scheffer, in which the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the Military Rule of Evidence."' In addition, sev-
eral courts that had recognized the admissibility of stipulated poly-
graph results retreated, reverting back to the per se exclusion rule."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in State v. Deane' may be the
most significant. That court jettisoned its earlier opinion after the Sev-
enth Circuit held in McMorris v. Israel' that the prosecution in a stipu-
lation state was constitutionally required to justify its refusal to stipu-
late. 2
51. Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App. 1982).
52. In re X, 714 P.2d 13, 19 (Idaho 1986).
53. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 253-54 (C.M.A. 1987).
54. United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
55. CAL. EvID. CODE § 351.1.
56. See note 41 and accompanying text (discussing A Juvenile).
57. See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989).
58. United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
59. See, e.g., State v. Milano, 256 S.E.2d 154 (N.C. 1979), overruled by State v. Grier.
300 S.E.2d 351, 356-61 (N.C. 1983); State v. Stanislawski, 216 N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 1974). over-
ruled by State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wis. 1981). See also Castleberry v. State. 522
P.2d 257 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Jones v. State, 527 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
overruled by Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871,872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
60. 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wis. 1981).
61. 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981).
62. Although stipulated polygraph results were admissible under Wisconsin law at that
time, the prosecutor, without offering any reasons, refused to stipulate. In granting habeas
corpus relief, the Seventh Circuit wrote: "Where credibility is as critical as in the instant case,
the circumstances are such as to make the polygraph evidence materially exculpatory within
the meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 462. The court, however, rested its decision on nar-
rower grounds: The prosecution's refusal to stipulate without offering a valid ground for the
refusal deprived the defendant of due process. "From all that appears, [the prosecutor] was
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Finally, Congress passed the Employee Polygraph Protection Acte
in 1988. With limited exceptions, the Act prohibits the use of poly-
graph tests for preemployment screening or during the course of pri-
vate employment. Governmental entities are exempt. Although the
Act does not apply in criminal cases, it had the effect of putting many
polygraphers out of business, including many incompetent ones.
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert, and the lower
courts, once again, were forced to address polygraph evidence. To un-
derstand the post-Daubert cases, some appreciation of the fundamental
elements of polygraph testing is required.
H. Polygraph Technique
A. Theory
Modem polygraph procedures developed over a long time, com-
mencing around the turn of the century.64 The most common poly-
graph examination today, the control question technique (CQT),j is
based upon two premises: (1) the psychological stress caused by the
fear of detection produces involuntary physiological responses in the
autonomic nervous system, and (2) a polygraph examiner, based on
these responses as recorded by a polygraph instrument, can detect this
fear.
acting solely for tactical reasons in the belief that a test would not be helpful to his case. If
the prosecutor refuses and states reasons, it then becomes the duty of the court to determine
whether the reasons offered rise above the purely tactical considerations present in a given
case." Id. at 466. Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized McMorris as a "dubious constitu-
tional holding." Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967, 970 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 2001-09 (1994).
64. The technical discussion in this section is taken from 1 GIANNELLI &
IMvWINKELRIED, supra note 2, ch. 8. See also 1 DAVID FAIGMAN Er AL., MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 14 (1996).
65. A different examination, the "Guilty Knowledge Test" (GKT) or "Concealed
Knowledge Test," may be used when important information about a crime has not been dis-
closed to the public. Consequently, only the perpetrator, and not other suspects, will possess
this knowledge and react to it during the test. The theory of this test differs markedly from
the CQT, which is a deception test; the GKT is an "information" test. The requirement of
concealed information, however, greatly limits the use of this examination. See David C.
Raskin, The Polygraph in 1986: Scientifi4 Professional and Legal Issues Surrounding Appli-
cation and Acceptance of Polygraph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 29, 31-32 ("[I]t is em-
ployed infrequently because the special information necessary to construct a valid concealed
information test is typically lacking.").
66. A report by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) explained:
The basic theory of polygraph testing is only partially developed. The testing proc-
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B. Instrument
The physiological responses used in polygraph testing are changes
in blood pressure-pulse, respiration, and galvanic skin resistance. The
polygraph instrument simultaneously and continuously measures and
records these physiological reactions on a graph or chart (polygram). 7
A quality polygraph instrument can accurately measure and record
these responses. The modern instruments are lap top computers. The
instrument, however, detects neither deception nor the fear of detec-
tion; it provides only a recording of physiological responses. It is the
examiner who, based on these recordings, infers deception.
C. Procedure
The CQT involves several steps, the most important of which are
the pretest interview, the examination of the subject while attached to
the instrument, and chart interpretation. A post-test interview is con-
sidered important by some authorities 8 However, its principal func-
tion is to elicit a confession from subjects considered deceptive, and it
is quite effective for this purpose.
The pretest interview serves a variety of critical functions. First, it
is used to acquaint the subject with the effectiveness of the technique;
this will allay the apprehensions of the truthful subject and stimulate
the deceptive subject's concern about the prospect of detection. Sec-
ond, the interview is used to assess the suitability of the subject for
testing. The examiner may be alerted to some condition, such as a
physical ailment, low intelligence, or the use of medication, that may
affect the test results. Third, test questions are formulated with the
ess is complex and not amenable to easy understanding. The most commonly ac-
cepted theory at present is that, when the person being examined fears detection,
that fear produces a measurable physiological reaction when the person responds
deceptively. Thus, in this theory, the polygraph instrument is measuring the fear of
detection rather than deception per se. And the examiner infers deception when
the physiological response to questions about the crime or unauthorized activity is
greater than the response to other questions.
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
POLYGRAPH TESTING: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION - A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM,
OTA-TM-H- 15 (1983) [hereinafter OTA REPORT], reprinted in 12 POLYGRAPH 196. 201
(1983).
67. Blood pressure and pulse are measured by a sphygmomanometer (blood pressure
cuff) that is placed on the subject's arm, respiration is measured by pneumograph tubes fas-
tened around the subject's abdomen and chest, and galvanic skin response is measured by
electrodes attached to the subject's fingertips.
68. See JOHN E. REID & FRED E. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 4 (2d ed. 1977).
Unlike the other stages, the examiner need not remain objective in the post-test interview.
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subject's assistance during the interview. The examiner must define
and clarify the issues of the test.
D. Examiner
The examiner's role cannot be overstated, because it is the exam-
iner who decides whether there is sufficient indication of deception. 9
The examiner's expertise is critical in (1) determining the suitability of
the subject for testing, (2) formulating proper test questions, (3) estab-
lishing the necessary rapport with the subject, (4) detecting attempts to
mask or create chart reactions, or other countermeasures, (5) stimu-
lating the subject to react, and (6) interpreting the charts. Even though
the examiner is the linchpin of the procedure, proponents acknowledge
that there are serious problems on this score. Dr. David Raskin has
commented that "a substantial proportion of those who conduct tests
in the public and private sectors lack adequate training and compe-
tence."'70 Others have observed that "[p]olygraph examiners in the
United States, as a whole, are poorly trained."'"
The American Polygraph Association (APA) 2 accredits poly-
graph schools.7 The private schools conduct a seven-week course,
69. The OTA report stated:
[T]he polygraph is not simply a machine or instrument that signals whether a per-
son is being truthful or deceptive. The instrument cannot itself detect deception.
A polygraph test is very complex and depends heavily on the interaction between
the examiner and the individual being tested, and requires that the examiner infer
deception or truthfulness based on a comparison of the person's physiological re-
sponses to various questions. The quality of the questions asked depends in part on
what information the examiner already has about the person being questioned.
OTA REPORT, supra note 66, reprinted in 12 POLYGRAPH at 196 (statement of John Gib-
bons, Director of Office of Technology Assessment).
70. Raskin, supra note 65, at 66-67. "As bad as the situation is in the federal sector, it is
generally worse in the local law enforcement agencies and in the private sector." Id at 68.
71. Charles R. Honts & Mary V. Perry, Polygraph Admissibility, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 357, 375 (1992). See also Charles R. Honts & Bruce D. Quick, The Polygraph in
1995: Progress in Science and the Law, 71 N.D. L. REv. 987, 998 (1995) ("Given the poor
general state of examiner training in the polygraph profession, the assessment of competence
of the specific examiner offering evidence is critically important.").
72. The APA was founded in 1966. It publishes a quarterly journal entitled Polygraph
and a bimonthly newsletter. "The American Polygraph Association (APA) is an interna-
tional association which represents the polygraph profession in programs which establish
standards of ethical practice, techniques, instrumentation, and training. The APA has ap-
proximately 2,000 members, of which the majority are in the United States." Polygraph. Is-
sues and Answers, 25 POLYGRAPH 134,145 (1996).
73. The APA has accredited fourteen polygraph schools. One school is in Canada (Ca-
nadian Police College Polygraph School). The others are located in the United States, in-
cluding two government-sponsored schools: DoD Polygraph Institute and the Texas De-
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while the DoD Polygraph Institute runs a 14-week course.74 Twenty-
nine states have licensing statutes.
E. Types of Examinations
Polygraph examinations can be divided into two categories based
on the purpose of the examination. One type focuses on a specific in-
cident, typically a crime or other occurrence involving misconduct.
The second type is a "background" examination, involving past con-
duct over a period of time. The typical pre-employment screening test
is an example. Although the use of this type of examination has been
greatly limited by the 1988 federal act, screening tests are still used ex-
tensively by the federal, state, and local governments, especially in law
enforcement. Indeed, in "case studies carried out in Illinois, Ohio,
Maryland and Florida it was found that out of 3,576 police applicants
given pre-employment polygraph examinations, 58% (2,068) were
identified as high risk candidates for police work in that they had be-
havioral histories of involvement in activities such as felony thefts, bur-
glaries, robberies, the use and sale of illegal drugs, bribery, car thefts,
and various sexual offenses., 76 Similar tests are used in the intelligence
and national security communities.77
F. Types of Formats
Examiners can use several different types of formats for investi-
gating a specific incident. The early examiners used the "relevant-
irrelevant question" test (RIT). Relevant questions concern the sub-
ject matter under investigation. For example: "Did you take $100 from
your employer's safe?" Irrelevant or neutral questions are used to ob-
partment of Public Safety Law Enforcement Polygraph School.
74. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
75. See Polygraph: Issues and Answers, supra note 72, at 142.
76. Id. at 135 ("According to a recent survey over 60% of the large police departments
in the United States use polygraph testing in the pre-employment screening process. Police
agencies have found that polygraph testing is a very effective means by which to identify
high risk candidates.").
77. The DoD 1994 report stated: "During fiscal year 1994, DoD investigations obtained
unique and significant information from interviews conducted with the aid of the polygraph.
In all illustrated instances, the polygraph examination process produced significant security
or criminal information which would not otherwise have been secured for the specific inves-
tigation. The polygraph examination process was also valuable in helping to establish the
innocence of persons charged with serious infractions." DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
POLYGRAPH PROGRAM, 1994 REPORT TO CONGRESS, reprinted at 24 POLYGRAPH 19
(1995). See also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM. 1993 REPORT TO
CONGRESS, reprinted at 23 POLYGRAPH 61 (1994).
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tain a subject's normal truthful reactions and chart tracings. Examples
of irrelevant questions are: "Is your name [subject's name]?" and "Are
you over 21 years of age?" The response to the relevant questions are
compared with the subject's response to irrelevant questions. The
main criticism of the RIT in this context is its underlying assumption
that an innocent person will not react to the relevant questions."
The control question test was developed in the 1940's as an im-
provement of the relevant-irrelevant exam.79 Control questions con-
cern "an act of wrongdoing of the same general nature as the main in-
cident under investigation, and one to which the subject, in all prob-
ability, will lie or to which his answer will be of dubious validity in his
own mind."' For this reason, they are sometimes called "probable lie"
questions and are typically general and vague-for example, "Before
the age of 25, did you ever steal anything?" Control questions are de-
signed as a stimulus for the truthful subject. Generally, the truthful
person will respond more to the control questions than to the relevant
questions because they represent a greater threat to that person. For
the same reason, the deceptive person will respond more to the rele-
vant questions than to the control questions. Therefore, the subject's
comparative responses to the control and relevant questions are the
key in the CQT.8' A better name would be the "comparison" question
test because the CQT does not involve "controls" in the scientific sense
of that word.
Questions are formulated to elicit either a "yes" or "no" response.
There are no surprise questions; the examiner reviews the questions
with the subject during the pretest interview to ensure understanding.
The examination typically consists of ten to twelve questions. While
the subject knows the questions, she does not know the order in which
they will be asked. The examination lasts several minutes and is re-
peated at least one more time; often two or three more examinations
are conducted.82 Formulating adequate control questions is not an easy
78. See Honts & Perry, supra note 71, at 359 ("Almost all of the scientists involved in
detection of deception research reject the notion that the relevant-irrelevant test could be a
useful discriminator of truth and deception."). The RIT is most often used for background
or pre-employment screening but is sometimes used in criminal cases.
79. See John E. Reid, A Revised Questioning Technique in Lie Detection Tests, 37 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 542 (1947).
80. REID & INBAU, supra note 68, at 28.
81. "[Ijnnocent subjects are expected to show stronger reactions to the control ques-
tions than to the relevant questions, whereas guilty subjects are expected to show the oppo-
site." John C. Kircher & David C. Raskin, Human Versus Computerized Evaluations of
Polygraph Data in a Laboratory Setting, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 291 (1988).
82. As part of the examination, a "stimulation" test is often administered; the test is
intended to impress the subject with the efficacy of the technique. A wide variety of stimula-
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There are several different types of CQT. "[T]he two most widely
used formats are the zone comparison and the modified general ques-
tion test (MGQT)."' Some formats contain additional types of ques-
tions. For example, a "sacrifice relevant question" may be used as the
first relevant question-e.g., "In regard to the theft, do you intend to
answer the questions truthfully?" This question is not evaluated be-
cause it is assumed that the first introduction of the subject under in-
vestigation will trigger a response, even from an innocent person. A
"symptomatic" question may also be used-e.g., "Are you convinced
that I will not ask you a question that has not already been reviewed?"
This question is intended to identify a subject who is concerned with
some topic other than the one under investigation. 
86
A recent refinement is the "directed lie" control question. In this
procedure, the subject is told to lie to the directed control question'-
for example, "Before age 25, did you ever tell a lie?" Subjects are in-
structed that if their reaction to this question is not sufficiently strong,
the test will be inconclusive. In theory, guilty subjects will be uncon-
cerned about this question and focus on the relevant questions. In con-
trast, innocent subjects will react because they are concerned about an
inconclusive result.' Nevertheless, this format is not recognized as an
improvement by some federal agencies.
tion tests are used. An issue of Polygraph is devoted to the subject. 7 POLYGRAPH 173-214
(1978). See Ronald E. Decker, The Army Stimulation Test-A Control Procedure, 7
POLYGRAPH 176, 176 (1978) ("There is absolutely no trickery in this test.").
83. See Ray H. Bull, What is the Lie-Detection Test?, in THE POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES,
TRUTH AND SCIENCE 14 (Anthony Gale ed. 1988) ("[lIt is extremely difficult to devise con-
trol questions that would ensure the eliciting of stronger reactions in an innocent person than
would the relevant questions relating to the crime of which they had been accused.").
84. Dale E. Olsen et al., Computerized Polygraph Scoring System, 42 J. FORENSIC SC.
61, 61 (1997).
85. See id. at 62. See also Michael H. Capps, Predictive Vahe of the Sacrifice Relevant.
20 POLYGRAPH 1 (1991); Frank Horvath, The Value and Effectiveness of the Sacrifice Rele-
vant Question: An Empirical Assessment, 23 POLYGRAPH 261 (1994).
86. See Michael H. Capps et al., Effectiveness of the Symptomatic Question, 22
POLYGRAPH 285 (1993).
87. See Charles R. Honts & David C. Raskin, A Field Study of the Validity of the Di-
rected Lie Control Question, 16 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 56 (1988).
88. "The directed lie test represents an improvement over the traditional control ques-
tion test, in that it is more standardized in structure, is easier to administer, requires less ma-
nipulation of the subject, and is more readily explained to lawyers, judges, and juries, ac-
cording to Raskin. Most important, it reduces the number of false positives." BNA
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 199.
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G. Methods of Evaluation
There are three methods of evaluation: global, numerical, and
computerized. Global evaluation, the oldest method, involves an over-
all impression of the charts plus other factors. The most controversial
of these other factors is the examiner's "clinical impressions" of the
subject during the pretest interview and the examination. In other
words, the examiner considers the subject's demeanor ("body lan-
guage") as well as the recorded reactions of the instrument.89 Critics
contend that such a judgment is "a highly subjective and hence specula-
tive interpretation about the meaning of a complex series of verbal,
behavioral and physiological responses. ' 9°
The numerical approach was developed about 1960. The subject's
behavioral reactions are not considered, only, the recorded chart reac-
tions. There are several different scoring systems.9' The DoD Polygra-
ph Institute and the University of Utah have developed similar sys-
tems.' The comparative reaction to each pair of relevant and control
questions is scored. The scores range from 3 for a dramatic reaction to
a control question to -3 for the same type of reaction to a relevant
question. Noticeable but smaller reactions are scored 1 or -1. A lack
of a significant reaction is scored 0. Total scores of 6 or higher indicate
truthfulness, while -6 or lower indicate deception. Scores that fall in
between are considered inconclusive. The primary advantage of the
numerical approach is that it "helps to ensure a rigorous, semi-
objective evaluation of the physiological information contained in the
charts." 93 Numerical scoring reduces, but does not eliminate, subjec-
tivity.9
4
Computerized scoring is the third method." There are four algo-
89. "For example, [the examiner] must look at the polygraph charts, the suspect's de-
meanor and behavior, the case facts, and whatever other indicators there may be." Gordon
H. Barland, Standards for the Admissibility of Polygraph Results as Evidence, 16 U.W.L.A.
L. REV. 37,39 (1984).
90. Benjamin Kleinmuntz, The Polygraph as Credible Court Evidence, THE CHAMPION
14, 16 (Sept.-Oct. 1984).
91. See Michael H. Capps & Norman Ansley, Numerical Scoring of Polygraph Charts:
What Examiners Really Do, 21 POLYGRAPH 264 (1992).
92. See Raskin, supra note 65, at 37-38.
93. Barland, supra note 89, at 40.
94. See Olsen et al., supra note 84, at 61 & 62 ("Although substantial differences in in-
terpretation are uncommon, practitioners can and do differ in their conclusions."; "Examin-
ers will differ on how they award points.").
95. See William J. Yankee, The Current Status of Research in Forensic Psychophysiol-
ogy and Its Application in the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception, 40 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 63, 64 (1995) (computerized polygraph instruments include Axciton, Stoelting, and
Lafayette).
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rithms currently available: PolyScoreTM (Applied Physics Laboratory.
Johns Hopkins University),96 Computerized Polygraph System (Univer-
sity of Utah), Axciton, and Identifi. Computer scoring may be used as a
quality control procedure or as the principal scorer; the latter method
is only developmental at this time.
H. Quality Control Procedures
Typically, polygraph examinations conducted by federal agencies
are independently reviewed by senior examiners. These agencies use
numerical scoring, and the quality control reviews are "blind" examina-
tions; the charts are evaluated without viewing the subject, or knowing
the field examiner's conclusion. As noted above, computers can also
be used for quality control.97 An automated system reduces the risk of
human error and minimize disagreements among examiners."" Unfor-
tunately, many examinations are conducted without any quality control
safeguards.
111. Validity
The validity of polygraph testing in criminal investigations remains
controversial. The question is extremely complex." Critics argue that
the physiological responses caused by the fear of detection have not
been shown to differ from physiological responses caused by other
emotions." Proponents, however, do not claim that there is a special
96. See Olsen et al., supra note 84, at 61.
97. "Dichotomous computer classifications of subjects in the standardization sample
were 93% correct. Blind numerical evaluations of the same data by an expert interpreter
were 89% correct." Kircher & Raskin, supra note 81, at 291. This study used mock crime
experiments and thus its application to field conditions cannot be assumed. See id. at 301. In
a later field study, using U.S. Secret Service examiners, the computer evaluations proved re-
liable: "[T]he accuracy of human and computer interpretations was higher than the blind in-
terpretations, and it ranged from 95-96% on confirmed truthful subjects and 83-96% on con-
firmed deceptive subjects." DAVID C. RASKIN ET AL., A STUDY OF THE VALIDITY OF
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (May 1988) (Nat'l Inst. Of Jus-
tice, Grant No. 85-IJ-CX-0040).
98. "Disagreements among polygraph examiners are common and limit the validity and
utility of the technique in applied settings." Kircher & Raskin, supra note 81, at 292.
99. See Gordon H. Barland & David C. Raskin, Detection of Deception. in
ELECrRODERMAL ACTIVITY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 417, 435 (W. Prokasy &
David Raskin eds. 1973).
100. See Benjamin Kleinmuntz & Julian J. Szucko, On the Fallibility of Lie Detection. 17
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 85,87 (1982):
[T]here is no reason to believe that lying produces distinctive physiological changes
that characterize it and only it .... [Tihere is no set of responses-physiological or
otherwise-that humans emit only when lying or that they produce only when tell-
ing the truth. ... No doubt when we tell a lie many of us experience an inner tur-
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physiological response that indicates deception. Rather, they believe
that certain changes in physiological reactions in response to different
types of questions indicate deception.
A. Purpose of Study
Some polygraph studies test for validity, while others test for reli-
ability.'' The term "validity" refers to a test procedure's accuracy, that
is, its ability to measure what it is supposed to measure. The term "re-
liability" refers to the test's consistency: whether the same results are
obtained each time it is performed." Validity includes reliability, but
the converse is not necessarily true.01 Understanding the literature on
this subject also requires an appreciation of a number of additional is-
sues. First, some tests such as the CQT appear to be "more accurate at
detecting the deception of the guilty person than detecting the truth-
fulness of the innocent person."'' Second, the subject of the test-
whether suspect or victim-may also be important. Apparently, false
positives are more frequent with victims than with suspects." Third,
the type of issue involved is important: polygraph examinations
involving specific factual issues produce more valid results than those
involving mental state issues.
B. Field & Laboratory Studies
There are two different kinds of polygraph validity studies: (1)
field studies of actual cases, and (2) mock crime experiments, which are
moil, but we experience a similar turmoil when we are falsely accused of a crime,
when we are anxious about having to defend ourselves against accusations, when
we are questioned about sensitive topics-and, for that matter, when we are elated
or otherwise emotionally stirred.
101. Another purpose (albeit non-scientific) involves an evaluation of the "utility" of the
polygraph. Even if polygraph evidence is not admitted at trial, it may nevertheless be suffi-
ciently reliable for other important uses, such as preemployment screening for police de-
partments, national security purposes, and criminal investigations.
102- See Gordon H. Barland, The Reliability of Polygraph Chart Evaluation, in LEGAL
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH 120,121 (Norman Ansley 1975).
103. The latter would include a study designed to determine whether a single examiner
reaches consistent results over a period of time, or whether several different examiners reach
the same conclusion when the same subject is tested.
104. Gordon H. Barland, The Polygraph Test in the USA and Elsewhere, in THE
POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES, TRUTH AND SCIENCE 73 (Anthony Gale ed. 1988).
105. See David C. Raskin, Does Science Support Polygraph Testing?, in TE POLY-
GRAPH TEST: LIES, TRuTH AND SCIENCE 96, 101 (Anthony Gale ed. 1988); Barland, supra
note 104, at 83.
106. See Barland, supra note 104, at 83-84; Raskin, supra note 65, at 46-47.
Apr. 1998]
laboratory simulations. Both have drawbacks. Field studies depend on
establishing a valid criterion for determining guilt or innocence-some-
times called "ground truth." Some studies use panels of trial attorneys
to determine guilt, an approach with obvious problems. Dr. Raskin ar-
gued that the best criterion is confirmation by a subject's later con-
fession."7 Others, however, have pointed out that the confession crite-
rion introduces a number of problems of sampling bias." The best
available base line is probably confessions that have been independ-
ently corroborated to some degree.
Laboratory experimentation has different limitations. There are
important differences between the laboratory and forensic environ-
ments that may undermine the validity of these experiments. The prin-
cipal difference is that fear of detection is not as strong for experi-
mental subjects.1" In addition, some of the laboratory studies fail to
replicate field conditions; they use neither experienced examiners nor
general population samples as subjects."'
C. Selected Studies
The validity of polygraph testing is hotly disputed. In the fall of
1983, the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress sub-
mitted a report in which it reviewed and evaluated the research on
polygraph validity. The report includes the following passage as part of
its findings:
OTA found meaningful scientific evidence of polygraph validity only
107. See Raskin, supra note 65, at 44 (stating that the best available method uses cases in
which suspects confess after the polygraph examination, after which the charts are evaluated
blindly by independent examiners).
108. See Christopher J. Patrick & William G. Iacono, Validity of the Control Question
Polygraph Test: The Problem of Sampling Bias, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 229. 229 (1991)
("A deceptive polygraph test outcome provides the incentive for an examiner to interrogate
a subject, and if the subject confesses, the polygraph outcome is confirmed. (In the ultimate
version of this self-fulfilling prophecy, an examiner may accept a minor admission from the
subject--one that does not relate specifically to the issue of the polygraph test-as evidence
of the subject's guilt.")).
109. See David Lykken, The Lie Detector and the Law, 8 CRIM. DEF. 19, 23 (May-June
1981) ("Since the emotional impact of such artificial simulations, as well as the importance to
the individual of the outcome, is inevitably very different than in real life situations, such
laboratory assessments provide no valid basis for estimating the accuracy of the lie test in the
field."). Researchers attempt to solve this problem by using substantial cash bonuses. See
Raskin, supra note 105, at 99.
110. See Norman Ansley, Simulations and Polygraph Research, 24 POLYGRAPH 275.282
(1995) ("If researchers want to know about the validity of polygraph examinations or find
data on other aspects of field testing, simulations in the laboratory where they can control
the factors under study need to be as much like field conditions as possible.").
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in the area of criminal investigations. However, even here, there is a
wide divergence in the results of the relevant research. Six prior re-
search reviews showed average validity ranging from a low of 64 per-
cent to a high of 98 percent. OTA's own review of 28 studies meeting
minimum acceptable scientific criteria found that, for example, cor-
rect guilty detections ranged from 17 to 100 percent. Overall, the
cumulative research evidence suggests that when used in criminal in-
vestigations, the polygraph test detects deception better than chance,
but with significant error rates."
In contrast, a 1984 Department of Defense report reached far
more favorable conclusions about polygraph validity:
Thus, the Bersh study, experience of investigators and quality control
personnel, and mock crime laboratory studies give different estimates
of the accuracy of control question tests in criminal investigations,
ranging from about 80% to 95%. ... [Tihere are no data suggesting
that the various polygraph techniques and applications in [the De-
partment of Defense] have high false positive or high false negative
error rates.'12
A significant problem in interpreting the various reports concerns
which studies used scientifically valid methodologies.' In 1986, Dr.
Raskin cited five mock crime studies that he considered valid because
they used the control question technique, trained examiners, field tech-
niques, and non-student populations. He concluded: "The combined
accuracy of decisions was 95%, with an inconclusive rate of 8%. It
should be noted that the majority of errors were false positive errors of
diagnosing deception in subjects who were actually truthful. The
evaluations misdiagnosed 8% of innocent subjects as deceptive and
only 3% of guilty subjects as truthful (false negative errors)." ' In
1988, Dr. Raskin and his colleagues reported the results of a field study
on the control question technique as administered by Secret Service
personnel. In addition to field examiners, blind interpretation of charts
by quality control examiners and computer interpretation were stud-
ied. The report concluded: "The accuracy of human and computer in-
terpretations was very high. Decision by the original examiners on in-
111. OTA REPORT, supra note 66, reprinted in 12 POLYGRAPH 196,200.
112. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TBE AccuRAcY AND UTILITY OF POLYGRAPH
TESTING (1984), reprinted in 13 POLYGRAPH 63.
113. See John C. Kircher et al., Meta-Analysis of Mock Crime Studies of the Control
Polygraph Technique, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 79 (1988) (differences in subjects, incen-
tives, and decision policies may account for as much as 65% of the observed variance in de-
tection rates).
114. Raskin, supra note 65, at 42 ("These error rates indicate the limitations of the con-
trol question technique, even when it is performed under carefully controlled conditions by
highly skilled examiners with extensive psychological training and expertise.").
Apr. 1998] POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
dividual relevant questions ranged from 91-96% correct on confirmed
truthful answers and 85-95% correct on confirmed deceptive answers.
Blind interpretation produced somewhat lower accuracies, ranging
from 63-85% on truthful answers and 84-94% on deceptive answers. ' ...
Nevertheless, the controversy continued. Iacono and Patrick con-
cluded in 1988 that the "best defense one can offer for the continued
use of the CQT is that its accuracy is indeterminate."' 16 In 1989, Raskin
responded: "The voluminous scientific literature indicates that they can
be highly accurate when properly employed in appropriate circum-
stances, but they are also subject to abuse and misinterpretation. '"7 A
decade later, the debate continues unabated."'
D. Computer Scoring
A significant recent development involves computer software pro-
grams to evaluate polygraph charts. For example, PolyScoreTM, devel-
oped by John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, is a
computerized algorithm for evaluating zone comparison examinations
and is based on digitized polygraph data from criminal investigations." 9
The program's evaluations differ from those used by examiners.
20
E. Countermeasures
Another important research issue involves countermeasures or
techniques to "beat" the test by a guilty subject. The OTA report com-
mented that the "research on countermeasures has been limited and
115. RASKIN ET AL., supra note 97 ("However, the accuracy of the computer in-
terpretations was higher than the blind interpretations, and it ranged from 95-96% on con-
firmed truthful suspects and 83-96% on confirmed deceptive subjects. The results provide
considerable support for the accuracy of decisions made by the original examiners concern-
ing the outcomes of polygraph tests.").
116. William G. Iacono & Christopher J. Patrick, Assessing Deception: Polygraph Tech-
niques, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 205, 233 (Richard
Rogers ed. 1988).
117. David C. Raskin, Polygraph Techniques for the Detection of Deception, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND EVIDENCE 247, 290
(David C. Raskin ed. 1989).
118. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 64, ch. 14.
119. See Olsen et al., supra note 84.
120. The lab started collecting data in 1989. The 1997 article concluded: (1) "Because
subject status, for many of the cases in the database, was determined by examiner decision,
these results demonstrate that the algorithm is consistent with experienced examiner deci-
sions." (2) "The results indicate that an algorithm has been built that can separate the con-
firmed truthful and deceptive subjects in this database." (3) "The algorithm does not mimic
traditional chart interpretation." Id. at 69-70.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
the results conflicting.' 121 Countermeasures can be divided into two
categories: (1) those that change the examinee's general physiological
state such as drugs and biofeedback, and (2) those that produce effects
at specific points in the examination such as mental imagery and physi-
cal countermeasures.'2
Physical countermeasures appear to pose the greatest threat to the
control question technique."z To be effective, the subject must pro-
duce stronger physiological responses to the control questions than to
the relevant questions. Biting the tongue or pressing toes against the
floor have produced significant false negative results in laboratory
studies. One study concluded that the principal threat are subjects who
"have received systematic training in countermeasures."'" Spontane-
ous countermeasures were not effective. Another study concluded that
a polygraph instrument with an activity sensor would detect most at-
tempts at physical countermeasures. 12
F. Friendly Polygrapher Issue
The friendly polygrapher hypothesis, first raised by Dr. Martin
Orne as an issue worth investigating,"2 suggests that a polygraph ex-
amination privately conducted by the defense may not be reliable be-
cause the fear of detection is not sufficiently realistic; the defendant
knows that failing the test does not result in any adverse consequence.
Thus, the possibility of a false negative will increase. This hypothesis,
however, has never been established, and "[a]t present, the only re-
search bearing upon this hypothesis does not support it."127
IV. Evidentiary Standard
A number of objections to polygraph evidence can be labelled as
121. OTA REPORT, supra note 66, reprinted in 12 POLYGRAPH 196, 201. New types of
countermeasures have been reported. See Donald J. Krapohl, A Taxonomy of Polygraph
Countermeasures, 25 POLYGRAPH 35(1996).
122 See Charles C. Honts, Interpreting Research on Polygraph Countermeasures, 15 J.
POLICE SC!. & ADMIN. 204 (1987).
123. See Raskin, supra note 65, at 50-51.
124. Charles C. Honts et al., Effects of Spontaneous Countermeasures on the Physiologi-
cal Detection of Deception, 16 J. POLICE SC. & ADMIN. 91,93 (1988).
125. See Stanley Abrams & Michael Davidson, Counter-Countermeasures in Polygraph
Testing, 17 POLYGRAPH 16, 19 (1988).
126. See Martin Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection of Decep-
tion, in LEGAL ADMIsSIBiLrrY OFTHE POLYGRAPH 94 (Norman Ansley ed., 1975).
127. Barland, supra note 89, at 49. See also Raskin, supra note 65, at 63 ("When the
'friendly polygrapher' hypothesis is examined in light of all meaningful scientific data, no
credible evidence supports the theory.").
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"Rule 403 issues." These include the danger that the jury will overval-
ue the expert's testimony,128 the danger that an opinion concerning the
truthfulness of a witness will intrude too much into the jury's historic
function of assessing credibility,'29 and the possibility that the trial will
degenerate into a time-consuming trial of the technique.' None of
these issues are insurmountable, and other commentators have recent-
ly written on them.'3 ' Accordingly, this article focuses on the reliability
issue"or rather, how courts have dealt with this issue.
A. Frye Standard
An examination of the polygraph cases illustrates the advantage of
the Daubert approach over the Frye approach. Applying the Frye test
raises several issues. According to Frye, psychology and physiology are
the fields in which general acceptance must be achieved.'32 Several de-
cisions have expanded the "field" to include polygraph examiners.'" In
United States v. Alexander,' however, the Eighth Circuit rejected this
view. A related issue concerns the extent to which the widespread use
of the polygraph in law enforcement, intelligence, and industrial activi-
ties may be considered as evidence of general acceptance. Some courts
have accorded such evidence considerable weight,'3 while others have
128. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) ("When
polygraph evidence is offered .... it is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility.
akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi."); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 981 (La. 1979)
("trier of fact is apt to give almost conclusive weight to the polygraph expert's opinion").
129. See, e.g., People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1079 (Il. 1981) ("A potential trial by
polygraph is an unwarranted intrusion into the jury function."); State v. Davis, 407 So. 2d
702. 706 (La. 1981) ("usurps the jury's prerogative on a question involving credibility").
130. See, e.g., People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 196 (Mich. 1977) ("possibility of bog-
ging down trials with collateral matters, perhaps resulting in a trial of the polygraph. or a bat-
tle of experts"), State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351. 359-60 (N.C. 1983) ("possibility that the
criminal proceeding may degenerate into a trial of the polygraph machine").
131. The most thorough discussions are: Edward J. Imwinkelried & James R. McCall.
Issues Once Moot: The Other Evidentiary Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory Poly-
graph Examinations, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045 (1997); James R. McCall, Misconcep-
tions and Reevaluation-Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363.
132. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
133. See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 689 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (S.D. Cal.), affd. 470
F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973).
134. 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Experts in neurology, psychiatry and physi-
ology may offer needed enlightenment upon the basic premises of polygraphy. Polygraphists
often lack extensive training in these specialized sciences.").
135. See, e.g., United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989); Zeiger.
350 F. Supp. at 688; DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. at 1389.
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ignored it. Finally, the ultimate Frye proof-a Gallup poll-has been
cited as evidence of general acceptance 16 and has spawned its own con-
troversy.37
These issues take courts further away from the critical issue of re-
liability. I have written elsewhere: "Perhaps the most important flaw in
the Frye test is that by focusing attention on the general acceptance is-
sue, the test obscures critical problems in the use of a particular tech-
nique."'38 In contrast, Daubert requires courts to confront directly the
validity issue.
B. Daubert Standard
Although Daubert asks the right question, the admissibility deci-
sion under the Daubert reliability test is not necessarily easier to an-
swer. Some courts view Daubert as a less stringent standard than
Frye,'139 and the abandonment of the per-se exclusion rule in recent
polygraph cases supports this view.4 ' It is not my view, however. Dau-
bert, properly understood, adopts a different, but not a less stringent,
standard of admissibility. Cases limiting the admissibility of previously
well-established techniques such as handwriting"' and hair compari-
sons4' buttress this position.
136. A 1982 Gallup poll survey of the Society for Psychological Research reported that
61% of the 155 members responding believed that the polygraph is a useful diagnostic tool
when considered with other available information. Gallup Organization, Survey of Members
of the Society for Psychological Research Concerning Their Opinion of Polygraph Test Inter-
pretation, 13 POLYGRAPH 153,157 (1984).
137. See FAIGMAN ETAL, supra note 64.
138. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197,1226 (1980).
139. See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995) (" [B]y loosening the
strictures on scientific evidence set by Frye, Daubert reinforces the idea that there should be
a presumption of admissibility."), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1869 (1996); United States v. Bonds,
12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th Cir. 1993) ("We find that the DNA testimony easily meets the more
liberal test set out by the Supreme Court in Daubert.").
140. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663,668-69 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The Federal Rules
of Evidence, although concededly more liberal than the Frye test, still require a determina-
tion that the proffered scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable.").
141. See, e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(concluding that the "testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that forensic
document examination, despite the existence of a certification program, professional jour-
nals and other trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as 'scientific...
knowledge"').
142- See, e.g., Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okl. 1995) (ex-
cluding hair comparison while observing that the court had "been unsuccessful in its at-
tempts to locate any indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the re-
quirements of Daubert" Further, "[a]lthough the hair expert may have followed procedures
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Prior to Daubert, courts had identified several reliability factors:"'
(1) the lack of empirical validation,"' (2) the numerous uncontrollable
factors involved in the examination, "5 (3) the subjective nature of the
deception determination, ' and (4) the absence of adequate standards
for assessing the qualifications of examiners. 17 The Daubert Court cit-
ed a nonexhaustive list of factors, which trial courts may use to deter-
mine reliability: (1) whether the scientific technique has been tested,
(2) whether the technique has been subjected to peer review and publi-
cation, (3) the technique's rate of error, (4) the existence and main-
tenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, and (5) the
technique's "general acceptance." These factors are often difficult to
apply, as illustrated by the Court's questionable use of these factors in
Daubert itself.48 An argument can be made for the validity of all these
accepted in the community of hair experts, the human hair comparison results in this case
were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable"). The Tenth Circuit reversed because the district
court had used the wrong standard for habeas review. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1522,
1523 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding due proces, not Daubert standard applies in habeas proceed-
ings).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[W]e are
still unable to conclude that there is sufficient scientific acceptability and reliability to war-
rant the admission of the results of such tests in evidence."); People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d
1070, 1076 (Ill. 1981) ("[T]he primary obstacle in admission of polygraph evidence, stipu-
lated to or not, has continually and consistently been the instrument's disputed scientific reli-
ability.").
144. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D. Md. 1973) ("incipient
stage of experimental research"); People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 189 (Mich. 1977)
I"[W]e find there is difficulty in empirically verifying polygraphic findings .... some ques-
tions concerning the accuracy figures.... and an apparent lack of a rational scientific expla-
nation for this phenomenon.").
145. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 359 (Colo. 1981) ("Several uncontrolla-
ble or unascertainable physiological and psychological responses may cause difficulty or er-
ror .... "); Baynes, 430 N.E.2d at 1075 ("abnormal blood pressure, heart and respiratory ir-
regularities, fatigue. intoxication, rationalization, extreme nervousness, meditative
abstraction, controlled breathing, instrument discomfort, uncomfortable room temperature.
obesity, hidden muscular contractions, self-inflicted pain, mental incompetence, psychopathy
or schizophrenia, ingestion of a sedative, an attempt to suppress a cough, fear induced by
suspicion or accusation, or lack of fear of detection").
146. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 360 (Colo. 1981) (The polygraph tech-
nique, "albeit based on a scientific theory, remains an art with unusual responsibility placed
on the examiner."); People v. Monigan, 390 N.E.2d 562, 569 (Ill. App. 1979) ("almost total
subjectiveness surrounding the use of the polygraph and the interpretation of the results").
147. See Anderson, 637 P.2d at 360 ("The absence of adequate qualification standards
for the polygraph profession heighten[s] the possibility for grave abuse .... "); State v.
Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 982 (La. 1979) (lack of judicial and legislative control over compe-
tence of examiners).
148. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Riles of Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2222-25 (1994) (discussing problems with Daubert's use of the
voiceprint cases).
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factors, but they are often different ways of looking at the same prob-
lem" the underlying validity of polygraph evidence.
V. Polygraph Cases
Several aspects of the favorable polygraph cases are striking. The
first is the failure of the courts to appreciate the lack of basic scientific
research in this area. The second is the courts' failure to understand
the differences in polygraph techniques-assuming incorrectly that all
polygraph tests are alike. The third is the failure to specify the requi-
site qualifications for examiners.
A. Lack of Research
The polygraph has been around since Frye (1923), and courts of-
ten cite the tremendous advances that have been made over the last 70
years.' 9 Nevertheless, good scientific research on the polygraph is a re-
cent development, and these courts have not rigorously scrutinized this
issue.
In Ridling, the landmark 1972 case, the court wrote that the "sci-
entific psychological basis for the polygraph examination is well estab-
lished."'" The court did not, however, cite any validity studies to sup-
port this statement. The court did cite a polygraph text by Reid and
Inbau, the leading polygraph experts of their time. Reid and Inbau
wrote: "This estimate accords to the lie-detector technique, when ap-
plied under the most favorable conditions, an accuracy of 95 percent,
with a 4 percent margin of indefinite determinations and a 1 per cent
margin of possible error. 15  This error rate is suspect because it is
based on the assumption that polygraph results are correct unless
proven otherwise. No systematic follow-up studies were conducted to
verify the examiner's conclusions, verification criteria are not specified,
and improper procedures may have been used to compute the error
rate.'
149. See e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428,434 (5th Cir. 1995) ("There can be no
doubt that tremendous advances have been made in polygraph instrumentation and tech-
nique in the years since Frye."); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1530 (11th Cir.
1989) (commenting upon "the significant progress made in the field of polygraph testing
over the past forty years"); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Ariz. 1995)
("[Tihere has been a significant increase in the reliability of polygraph evidence over recent
years.").
150. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90,93 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
151. FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, LIE DETECrION AND CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 111 (3d ed. 1953).
152- See Orne, supra note 126, at 103-04; Validity Panel, in LEGAL ADMISSIBILrrY OF
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As noted earlier, in 1989 two noteworthy polygraph cases were
decided. In Piccinonna, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that polygraph
evidence was admissible even in the absence of a stipulation. The court
based its decision in part on "new empirical evidence and scholarly
opinion which have undercut many of the traditional arguments against
admission of polygraph evidence."'53 According to the court, there "is
no question that in recent years polygraph testing has gained increas-
ingly widespread acceptance.' 51 4 The second case, Mendes, 5 was de-
cided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In 1974 that
court had decided a landmark case admitting polygraph evidence with-
out stipulation.9 In Mendes the court abruptly changed direction and
excluded polygraph evidence, basing its opinion in part on "the failure
of the basic theory of polygraphy to have gained general acceptance
among physiological and psychological authorities."' 7 Thus, within the
span of three months two courts reached diametrically opposed views
on the validity of polygraph evidence, both basing their respective
opinions on "recent scientific research." Actually, neither court cited
the most recent research. Indeed, there are no citations to recent re-
search in the majority opinion in Piccinonna; only in the dissent is
polygraph research cited. In Posado, a 1995 decision, the Fifth Circuit
cited as "current research" no scientific article published after 1988. '"
The lack of quality research until quite recently has often been
commented on.9 In 1988, Dr. Gordon Barland wrote: "Only now are
superior paradigms being developed which combine the ground truth
of the laboratory with the realism of field applications.""' In 1992, the
FBI's top polygraph expert commented that "the greatest threat to
polygraph is the shakiness of the scientific theory upon which it
rests.' 16' He added:
THE POLYGRAPH 155 (Norman Ansley ed. 1975) (statement of Gordon H. Barland).
153. 885 F.2d at 1533.
154. Id. at 1535. On remand, the trial court excluded the evidence because the questions
and answers were irrelevant, and any probative value was outweighed by the danger of mis-
leading the jury. United States v. Piccinonna, 729 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
155. Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989).
156. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing A Juvenile).
157. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d at 35-36.
158. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995).
159. A 1984 DoD study noted that there "has been more scientific research conducted
on lie detection in the last six years than in the previous 60 years." DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, THE ACCURACY AND UTILITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING (1984), reprinted in 13
POLYGRAPH 1, 58 (1984).
160. Barland, supra note 104, at 76.
161. Ronald M. Furgerson, Perspectives on Polygraphs: A Guide to Survival, 21
POLYGRAPH 164, 167 (1992).
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We define control questions a little differently now, minor instrumen-
tation changes have occurred, and we score charts more objectively.
This is little change. Drew Richardson expressed it this way. He ob-
served that Robert Goddard would likely be amazed to see modem
space flight. And Alexander Fleming would be affected similarly
with modem medicine. But, were Dr. William Marston (of 1923 Frye
case fame), their most famous contemporary in lie detection to return
from the grave today, he would hardly feel he had skipped a beat.' 62
In 1995, the Director of the DoD Polygraph Institute noted: "The pe-
riod between 1986 and the present has been one of unparalleled ad-
vances in the psychophysiological detection of deception testing proce-
dures and processes. ' ' 63
In sum, the improvements in polygraph testing over the last 70 are
significant but do not, by themselves, answer the Daubert question-
whether the validity of the improvements has been scientifically estab-
lished.
B. Specificity of Procedure
Courts admitting polygraph evidence often refer to "properly con-
ducted" examinations without specifying what is a proper examina-
tion.'64 For example, in Ridling, the court did not specify what poly-
graph technique it was sanctioning; the CQT is not mentioned. Simi-
larly, in Posado, the Fifth Circuit was remarkably vague concerning the
specifics of polygraph examinations, mentioning only "controlled con-
ditions."'"5
The two leading federal district court cases are United States v.
Crumby'0 and United States v. Galbreth.'6 Dr. Raskin was the expert
in both cases. In Crumby, the court mentioned the control question
test but did not specify the method of evaluation (global or numerical).
Galbreth provides more information about the testing procedures
used.'0 It identifies the "directed lie control question" (which Crumby
162. Id at 165.
163. Yankee, supra note 95, at 63.
164. See e.g., United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 881 (D.N.M. 1995) ("[T]he va-
lidity of polygraph results in a particular case is absolutely dependent on certain conditions
such as a properly conducted examination by a competent examiner.").
165. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428,434 (5th Cir. 1995).
166. 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995).
167. 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995).
168. The court also cited N.M. R. Evid. 707 for guidance. The Rule does require taping
and disclosure of prior testing but little useful beyond this. It requires two relevant questions,
quantitative scoring, and at least three charts. The federal statute requires a pretest inter-
view, written questions, and a minimum of a 90 minute test. See supra note 63 and accompa-
Apr. 1998]
did not) but does not provide citations to the research it discusses.
Moreover, Crumby makes no reference to quality control, a significant
issue in any scientific procedure. Galbreth mentions quality control. 9
but does not seem to realize its importance, or that it is rare except in
federal examinations.'
70
The Galbreth opinion also mentions computer programs. The
court wrote:
The specific computer scoring method used in this case was devel-
oped by Dr. Raskin and has been subjected to scientific investigation.
It works by an analytic solution using a standard computer program.
The examiner simply runs the program and the computer makes tens
of thousands of calculations within five to ten seconds. This scoring
method is completely objective.
There are several problems with this passage. First, the method is
not "completely objective." As one published paper on computer
scoring acknowledged: "We emphasize that PolyScore can only effec-
tively evaluate properly collected data. If a subject is not a suitable
candidate for a polygraph examination, if the issue is not clearly de-
fined or of sufficient intensity, or if proper zone comparison procedures
are not used, accuracy will suffer."'72 In short, the computer input de-
pends on the examiner's ability, a subjective aspect of the technique.
Second, if the computer program arrived at its conclusions inde-
pendent of the examiner's method of scoring, as some programs do,''
the court has missed a critical point. This method of evaluation is sig-
nificantly different from examiner evaluation and should, therefore, be
independently scrutinized under Daubert. In other words, research on
the CQT as scored by examiners (even using a numerical scoring sys-
tem) does not validate an evaluation using a computer algorithm.
Moreover, the validity of one algorithm does not validate other algo-
rithms.
As they did with DNA evidence, courts should specify the particu-
nying text. Neither requires a quality control procedure.
169. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 892.
170. See Ronald M. Furgerson, Polygraph Policy Model for Law Enforcement, 56 F.B.I.
LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 7, 19 (June 1987) ("Experience has shown the value of quality
control as an integral part of law enforcement polygraph usage. In such a program, poly-
graph charts and documentation are reviewed 'in the blind' by another senior and well-
qualified examiner to insure that they substantiate the conclusion of the testing examiner as
to truth or deception."); Barland, supra note 89. at 50 ("By far the most important single
safeguard that should be required prior to admissibility of polygraph evidence is the review
of the polygraph examination by an objective, disinterested expert polygraph examiner.").
171. United States v. Galbreth, 908 F.Supp. 877, 888 (D.N.M. 1995).
172. Olsen et al., supra note 84, at 70.
173. See id. at 69; supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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lar procedure they are addressing and then ask whether this particular
procedure has been scientifically validated.
C. Examiner Qualifications
Courts admitting polygraph evidence also talk about "qualified ex-
aminers, '  again without specifying what qualifications are necessary.
This is rather strange when even polygraph proponents state that ex-
aminers' qualifications are often deplorable.75 Dr. Raskin was the ex-
pert in both Crumby and Galbreth. Very few examiners have his quali-
fications, which are primarily as a researcher.
As noted above, the DoDPI trains all federal polygraph examin-
ers. It "is the only program known to base its curriculum on forensic
psychophysiology, and conceptual, abstract, and applied knowledge
that meet the requirements of a master's degree-level of study."176 The
qualifications standards include a college degree (or equivalent), two
years' experience as an investigator, and a six-month internship that in-
cludes conducting at least 25 polygraph exams. In addition, 80 hours of
continuing instruction are required 'annually. Outside of federally
trained examiners, few have such qualifications.'
Conclusion
The polygraph should not be treated as "junk science." The cur-
rent research on computer algorithms is an important, promising de-
velopment. Moreover, the polygraph is now used extensively in crimi-
nal practice, albeit on the periphery of the trial. It often assists in the
extrajudicial resolution of difficult credibility cases-for example, child
sexual abuse cases. Paradoxically, these cases are often both too hard
and too easy to prove. It is not surprising that the DoD annual reports
include a disproportionate number of such cases, leading to confessions
as well as to exculpation. The polygraph may also assist in motions to
suppress (the issue in Posado).
Nevertheless, courts must scrutinize the admissibility issue with far
more care, specifying required procedures and requisite qualifications.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ("For a test
to be successful, it is important ... that a person skilled in the interpretation of the polygraph
charts make the interpretation of the test results.").
175. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
176. DoDPI 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 14.
177. See N.M. R. EVID. 707 (Minimum qualifications include five years' experience ad-
ministering or interpreting examinations or equivalent academic training and at least twenty
hours of continuing education during the twelve months prior to the examination offered in
evidence).
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Moreover, the use of court-appointed examiners to reduce subjective
bias is necessary.
